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ABSTRACT
Standardization and harmonization efforts have reached a
consensus towards using a special-purpose Vehicular Public-
Key Infrastructure (VPKI) in upcoming Vehicular Commu-
nication (VC) systems. However, there are still several tech-
nical challenges with no conclusive answers; one such an
important yet open challenge is the acquisition of short-
term credentials, pseudonym: how should each vehicle inter-
act with the VPKI, e.g., how frequently and for how long?
Should each vehicle itself determine the pseudonym lifetime?
Answering these questions is far from trivial. Each choice
can affect both the user privacy and the system performance
and possibly, as a result, its security. In this paper, we make
a novel systematic effort to address this multifaceted ques-
tion. We craft three generally applicable policies and ex-
perimentally evaluate the VPKI system performance, lever-
aging two large-scale mobility datasets. We consider the
most promising, in terms of efficiency, pseudonym acquisi-
tion policies; we find that within this class of policies, the
most promising policy in terms of privacy protection can be
supported with moderate overhead. Moreover, in all cases,
this work is the first to provide tangible evidence that the
state-of-the-art VPKI can serve sizable areas or domain with
modest computing resources.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular Communicationss (VCs) comprise vehicles and
Road Side Infrastructure (RSI) acting both as end-hosts and
routers, interacting in ad-hoc manner using wireless com-
munication technologies, such as 802.11 and cellular net-
works. Safe driving is the milestone application for VC.
Vehicles broadcast beacon messages in frequent time inter-
vals to report on their location, velocity and other safety-
critical information. Besides safety, proprietary applications
like location-based services, tolling systems and leisure ap-
plications, are expected to be developed for VC. Therefore,
a mixture of service providers and mobile devices will inter-
act with the VC, essentially being part of it, and will there-
fore form the security and privacy challenges for vehicular
networks.
Message alternation and fabrication, as well as Denial of
Service (DoS) pose important security challenges for VC
[13]. Availability of the infrastructure through wireless com-
munications is an additional network requirement for Vehicle-
to-X communications that should operate under low response
times. Additionally, Key Distribution and Authentication
are important aspects for VC that impose the existence of
a Certification Authority (CA) and eventually, secure hard-
ware modules in the vehicles to manage the cryptographic
keys [15]. On the flip side of the coin, authentication should
be addressed with respect to vehicle Location Privacy and
Anonymity, by protecting the vehicle from adversaries or
trusted but curious infrastructure.
The current standards [7] and automotive industry direc-
tions [4], as well as research projects [15], address security
and privacy challenges by suggesting an instantiation of a
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), known as Vehicular Pub-
lic Key Infrastructure (VPKI). Digital certificates signed
by a trusted authority, allow the propagation of trust in
the VPKI hierarchy and also, enable anonymous mutual au-
thentication between vehicles and the infrastructure. Short
lived digital certificates, the pseudonyms, are adopted as the
prevalent means to prevent the potential breach of vehicle
privacy. However, anonymous authentication per se cannot
address the need for authorization and accountability posed
by the large palette of future proprietary vehicular applica-
tions, and the current proposals should be enhanced towards
this direction.
In this work, we present the first implementation of a
VPKI, in order to secure VC using a privacy-preserving ar-
chitecture according to the standards. We present a kerber-
ized version of a VPKI using cryptographic tickets to enable
Authentication, Authorization and Accountability (AAA) to
the provided services. Our scheme offers credential manage-
ment, while preserving the privacy against the VPKI itself.
Finally, we present an efficiency evaluation of our implemen-
tation and demonstrate its applicability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in
Sec. 2 we present the related work, while in Sec. 3 we define
the problem statement. In Sec. 4 we outline our architecture
and protocols, while in Sec. 5 we demonstrate latency and
efficiency results. We conclude the paper with a discussion
and our future directions in Sec. 6.
2. RELATED WORK
Three anonymization schemas based on pseudonymous
certificates and group signatures presented in [2]. A draft
version of standards for secure VC employing the pseudonym
paradigm appeared in the IEEE 1609 family of standards
for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) [7].
Other standardization and harmonization efforts by the Car-
to-Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC) [4] and Eu-
ropean Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) [5]
also converged towards the usage of pseudonymous certifi-
cates for privacy-preserving vehicular applications. The Eu-
ropean Project SeVeCom [9] defines the architecture for se-
cure VC. In addition, it addresses aspects such as key man-
agement and distribution, vehicle certification, and creden-
tial management.
The effectiveness of pseudonyms in preserving anonymity
and location privacy for VC is studied in [17, 1]. Attackers
with overwhelming monitoring capabilities can compromise
privacy, but pseudonymous schemas undoubtedly offer im-
proved resilience against adversaries. The impact of security
on safety beaconing has been studied in [8, 12]. Although
the current proposals for security and privacy rely on the
implementation of a VPKI, this is the first work to provide
efficiency results and considers a AAA solution.
Ticket-based authentication mechanisms, such as Kerbe-
ros [10], centralize the identity management and account-
ability but do not offer anonymous service access. In [14]
a resolution approach using cryptographic tokens issued by
a trusted authority is presented. However, the pseudonym
acquisition protocol presented can compromise vehicle pri-
vacy (discussed later in Sec. 4.3). In this work, we present
a method of preserving the unlinkability of two consecutive
requests and thus improving privacy.
De-anonymization of the vehicles in case of user misbe-
havior is a requirement for safety applications in VC [15,
4]. Therefore, PKI paradigms such as [18, 6] cannot be
employed since they do not provide revocation or anony-
mity, respectively. Moreover, revocation schemas as pre-
sented in [3, 16] are not directly applicable in the VC setting,
since they do not offer identity resolution capabilities.
3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Each vehicle is equipped with a tamper-resistant crypto-
module able to perform advanced cryptographic operations,
such as to digitally sign and encrypt messages. All packets
transmitted by the vehicles should be authenticated. Packet
authentication is not a guarantee of correctness, but the
hardware security module greatly improves security as it
reduces the chances of cryptographic keys being stolen. Each
vehicle frequently broadcasts safety messages.
We consider adversaries that deviate from the expected
operation of the VC protocols and can harm the security
of the system and the privacy of its users in various ways.
Launching impersonation attacks, the attacker claims to
possess a legitimate identity and can fabricate messages or
replay old packets. Attackers can deliberately change the
content of packets to achieve erroneous or malicious be-
haviour. Such packet forgery attacks can result in serious
implications for VC especially when targeting safety bea-
cons. Moreover, adversaries might try to gain access to
VC services, and eventually obtain valid credentials, for ex-
ample pseudonyms. Non-repudiation is an important se-
curity property for VC, especially for accountability pur-
poses. Jamming in VC is a low effort attack that can be
launched over small or wider geographical areas, but is out
of the scope for this paper. Adversaries targeting vehicle
privacy and anonymity by linking successive pseudonyms,
can leverage on the information included in safety-beacons,
in order to reconstruct real vehicles’ whereabouts. For this,
academia, industry, and standardization bodies have con-
verged on the use of pseudonymous credentials for privacy
protection. Moreover, privacy needs to be considered even
in the presence of untrusted (i.e. honest-but-curious) in-
frastructure and misbehaving users. In the later case, the
anonymity provided by the pseudonymous identifiers needs
to be revoked.
All of the above underline the importance of secure and
privacy-preserving credential management for safety appli-
cations in VC. Nevertheless, given the near-deployment sta-
tus of VC, a whole ecosystem of non-safety services and
applications is on the way. To facilitate their adoption by
users, a VPKI must offer them security (i.e. AAA services)
and protect the privacy of travellers/users against inference
attacks and profiling. All these define the need for a scal-
able, modular and resilient VPKI implementation whose ser-
vices support, but can be extended beyond, the domain of
safety-applications. This becomes critical given the absence
of an implementation and evaluation of such an infrastruc-
ture. These points comprise the motivation and the scope of
our work. We design, implement and evaluate a standard-
compliant VPKI, able to accommodate the security and pri-
vacy requirements for safety applications and to offer secure
and privacy-preserving credential management to any other
vehicular application.
4. THE VPKI ARCHITECTURE
In this section we present our architecture and the relevant
protocols. We focus on the security and privacy aspects of
our approach, and define a privacy-preserving pseudonym
acquisition protocol which can be easily extended to support
other vehicular services.
4.1 Security & Privacy Discussion
Packets signed under the private key of the vehicle, re-
siding inside the hardware security module, are then trans-
mitted along with the corresponding certificate. The VPKI
architecture should support key management and certifi-
cate distribution, thus ensuring (i) VC message integrity,
(ii) message & vehicle authentication in both Vehicle-to-
Infrastructure (V2I) and Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), and (iii)
non-repudiation of origin security properties. Vehicles can
establish secure channels (e.g., using TLS tunnels), thus
achieving confidentiality against external eavesdroppers. Au-
thorization and accountability is accomplished using tickets;
that is reusable proofs of access rights to a given service.
Tickets are signed by a trusted authority to avoid forgery
and integrity attacks as presented in Sec. 4.3. We now dis-
cuss the usefulness of two types of certificates:
Pseudonyms. In order to preserve location privacy and
anonymity in VC, each vehicle possesses a set of short-lived
pseudonyms, obtained by a trusted pseudonym provider.
Each pseudonym has a lifetime ranging from seconds to
hours, defined by the pseudonyms provider. A vehicle can
decide to change the active pseudonym in order to prevent
the tracking of its location. Safety beacons are digitally
signed under the current pseudonym identity. By increas-
ing the frequency of pseudonym changes, the chances for an
adversary to launch a successful attack against privacy are
reduced.
Long-term Certificates. A pseudonym acquisition pro-
tocol is necessary to obtain new sets of pseudonyms when
the old ones are close to expire or have been already used.
However for accountability and authorization purposes, the
vehicle needs to be authenticated using its long-term iden-
tifier and then obtain anonymous authorization credentials,
in the form of tickets. For this reason, each vehicle should
be able to prove its real identity using a long-term identity.
4.2 Architecture Proposal
Our scheme comprises the following three trusted CAs,
according to the terminology used in [15] and compatible
with the definitions in [5]:
• Long-Term Certification Authority (LTCA):
The LTCA is the issuer of the vehicle’s long-term cer-
tificates and tickets.
• Pseudonym Certification Authority (PCA):
The PCA is the provider of the vehicle’s pseudonyms.
• Resolution Authority (RA):
The RA de-anonymizes pseudonymous certificates in
case of misbehavior detection.
The long-term certificate is a digital signature of the LTCA
over a set of vehicle-specific identifying data, a validity pe-
riod [ts, te], and the vehicle’s long-term public key Kv :
LTv = SigLTCA(Kv,datav , [ts, te])
We assume that each vehicle v has a long-term certificate
LTv and the corresponding private key kv pre-installed in its
hardware security module, as proposed in [11]. The vehicle
also obtains and stores a set of pseudonyms of the following
form:
P
i
v = SigPCA(K
i
v, [ts, te])
Pseudonyms also have a specified validity period [ts, te] and
contain a public key Kiv for verification.
4.3 Pseudonym Request Protocol
We now describe the protocol for the vehicles to obtain
pseudonyms from the PCA. All communications are per-
formed over a secure TLS tunnel, which guarantees confi-
dentiality against external adversaries, and prevents tickets
hijacking. For vehicle-to-PCA communications one-way au-
thentication of the server to the vehicle is used, in order to
preserve the anonymity of the vehicle. In a nutshell, the
protocol starts with the vehicle being authenticated by the
LTCA using its long-term credentials to obtain a ticket. The
ticket, tkt, does not contain any data attributable to the ve-
hicle and it is of the form:
tkt = SigLTCA([ts, te], {S1}, . . . , {Sn}),
where [ts, te] is the ticket validity period and Si is a generic
service identifier. By ensuring that te does not exceed the
subscription expiration time for any of the Si included in tkt,
the LTCA can guarantee that service subscription periods
are not violated.
V −→ LTCA : Sigkv (t1,Request) ‖ LTv (1a)
LTCA −→ V : tkt (1b)
Initially, the vehicle issues a ticket request to the LTCA
in order to obtain access to the PCA. The LTCA checks the
validity of the request, generates tkt and sends it back to the
vehicle. The vehicle then generates a set of private/public
key pairs (kiv,K
i
v) inside its hardware security module and
sends the public keys Kiv , along with tkt, to the PCA.
V −→ PCA : t3, tkt, {K
1
v , . . . ,K
n
v } (2a)
PCA −→ V : t4, {P
1
v , . . . , P
n
v } (2b)
The PCA assesses the validity of the ticket and signs the
received public keys Kiv using its private key. The pseudo-
nyms P iv are then sent back to the vehicle. The same ticket
can be re-used for multiple pseudonym requests, or different
service providers during its validity period.
Unlinkability of requests. We avoid signing pseudo-
nym requests under the long-term or the current-pseudonym
identities of the vehicle. In both cases the PCA can breach
vehicle privacy. In the first case, linking the issued pseudo-
nyms to the long-term identifier is trivial; in the latter case,
the PCA is able to link the new set of issued pseudonyms
with the one used for the request. Therefore the PCA can
link sets of pseudonyms and thus, compromise privacy. On
the other hand, using a new ticket-per-request can effectively
protect vehicle privacy against the PCA, since no linking is
possible between the ticket, the long-term certificate, or any
of the pseudonyms. Moreover, the vehicle can issue a re-
quest per pseudonym, thus restricting the ability of PCA
to link pseudonyms within a request. The proof of the un-
linkability is straightforward and omitted here due to space
limitations.
4.4 Pseudonym & Token Revocation
Pseudonyms and long-term certificates should be revoked
in a number of different scenarios: for example when a ve-
hicle is involved in an accident or misbehaves. Similarly, a
ticket can be revoked to deny access to the service e.g., in
case the ticket should not be reused. In order to keep the
network up-to-date in terms of the status of revoked certifi-
cates and tickets, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are
used. Revocation lists are publicly available, so that every
entity in the VC network has access to them. CRLs are digi-
tally signed with the private key of the authority that issues
them. The PCA signs the revocation lists containing the
revoked pseudonyms and the LTCA the CRLs containing
the long-term certificates. The dissemination of the CRLs
is orthogonal to this work. Equivalently, Ticket Revocation
List (TRL) can be used for ticket revocation, published by
the LTCA in case of ticket revocation. We omit further
discussions on ticket and certificate revocation in this work
because of the limited space.
4.5 Resolution Protocol
Due to the safety critical nature of VC, the revocation
of anonymous credentials is not sufficient per se and com-
plete vehicle de-anonymization is required. The resolution
protocol is executed with the RA acting as a coordinator be-
tween the PCA and the LTCA. The PCA reveals to the RA
the link between the pseudonyms and the anonymous ticket.
Then, the LTCA reveals the link between the the ticket the
vehicle’s real identity. Therefore, the RA can combine both
pieces of information and perform the resolution.
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Figure 1: Latency to obtain pseudonyms in seconds (per
vehicle).
The RA generates a digitally signed resolution request to
the PCA. The request includes the pseudonym P iv (or the
set of pseudonyms) that have to be resolved. The PCA
retrieves all the pseudonyms that were issued as a result
of the same vehicle pseudonym acquisition request from its
database, along with the corresponding ticket tkt.
RA −→ PCA : SigRA(P
i
v, t1) (3a)
PCA −→ RA : SigPCA(tkt, t2) (3b)
Having received the ticket tkt the RA forwards it to the
LTCA, which can in turn reveal the corresponding long-term
identity of the vehicle. Mappings between issued tickets and
the corresponding long-term identifiers exist in the database
of the LTCA.
RA −→ LTCA : SigRA(tkt, t3) (3c)
LTCA −→ RA : SigLTCA(LTv, t4) (3d)
With the completion of the protocol, the long term iden-
tity LTv is resolved and the vehicle’s pseudonyms have been
revoked. Revocation is performed according to the previ-
ous section, which will eventually evict the vehicle from the
VC network. The LTCA should also invalidate the received
tickets by including them in the TRL, to prevent adversaries
from distributing tickets among each-other.
5. RESULTS
In this section we present the performance of the proposed
VPKI architecture. CAs were implemented using OpenCA,
on separate servers equipped with an Intel Xeon Dual-Core
3.4 GHz processor and 8 Gbytes of RAM. All V2I and In-
frastructure to Infrastructure links are secured with TLS,
while the study of the communication channels are out of
the scope of this paper. ECC-256 keys are used for both
infrastructure and vehicle certificates. Our implementation
is compatible with the IEEE 1609.2 draft proposal [7]. The
ticket size is 498 bytes and the pseudonym size is 2.1 KBytes.
Vehicle: Pseudonym Request. In Fig. 1, we present
latency results for acquiring a set of pseudonyms from the
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Figure 2: Latency to obtain CRLs (per vehicle).
PCA. The vehicle needs 73, 4 ms to obtain a new ticket from
the LTCA (eq. 1). To acquire one pseudonym the vehicle
needs 120 ms and 3, 400 ms for 200 pseudonyms (eq. 2). For
requests of 1, 000 pseudonyms, which should be sufficient
for a relatively long period or time (e.g., for a day if the
pseudonym lifetime is around 1 minute), we observe that the
total latency is 16, 460 ms. 50% of the total latency concerns
PCA side operations, and 26% is devoted on the preparation
of the query, for examples the creation of private/public keys
and digital signatures over the public keys.
The preparation of the request can take place off-line,
which can eventually reduce the total time by 4, 260 ms
(darkest bar in Fig. 1). Excluding the verification and stor-
age time that occurs at the vehicle, the total processing
time (communication plus operation on the server) to ob-
tain 1, 000 pseudonyms is reduced to 8, 670 ms. Results
suggest that our approach is efficient. Additionally, taking
into consideration the fact that the vehicles will be equip-
ped with hardware accelerators [15], we can conclude that
the time required for a vehicle to obtain a pseudonym will
be significantly reduced.
Pseudonyms Req. 1 100 1.000 5.000 20.000
Signature Ver. 0, 004 0, 361 3, 3618 18, 09 72, 33
Pseudonyms Gen. 0, 004 0, 349 3, 34 17, 72 70, 9
Total Time 0, 02 0, 817 8, 826 41, 672 167, 3
Table 1: Latency to issue pseudonyms in seconds by the
PCA
PCA: Pseudonym Issuance. Table 1 shows the time
needed by the PCA to process pseudonym requests from ve-
hicles. The processing time includes the verification of the
received request (including ticket verification), pseudonym
generation time and other relevant PCA operations (e.g.,
storage and handling of the received public keys). For a to-
tal of 5, 000 pseudonym requests issued by multiple vehicles,
41, 672 ms are needed. For 20, 000 pseudonyms the server
needs 167, 300 ms. It is straightforward that the pseudo-
nym’s lifetime is a determinant factor for the PCA’s work-
load.
CRL Distribution. Fig. 2 shows the time needed by
a vehicle to obtain the CRLs of revoked pseudonyms. The
preparation of the request by a vehicle takes 11 msecs. The
Server Operations time corresponds to the generation of the
CRL (including signing it) at the PCA. We observe that
latency increases with the number of entries in the CRL.
For large chunks of information (e.g., 100, 000 entries in the
CRL) the communication time is an important fraction of
the total time; 1, 218 ms for 100, 000 entries in the CRL. For
the latter case, the verification of the PCA’s signature and
the storage of the obtained CRL, can take up to 1, 324 ms.
Pseudonyms Resolved 1 10 50 100 200
Pseudonyms Prov. (PCA) 73 135 304 516 922
Identity Prov. (LTCA) 9 10 15 20 57
Resolution Auth. (PRA) 265 348 604 916 1598
Table 2: Resolution latencies in milliseconds; PCA, LTCA
& PRA
Certificate Resolution. Certificate resolution (eq. 3)
times are presented in Table 2. Calculation times include
server side operations (e.g., fetching the requested certificate
from the database), sign and publish the certification list.
The LTCA has the lowest overhead, since the number of
tickets is less than the number of pseudonyms that need
to be retrieved from the databases of the LTCA and PCA
respectively. The resolution of 200 pseudonyms takes less
than 1, 000 ms for the the PCA, and we believe that our
resolution protocol does not introduce a significant overhead
for the VPKI. The RA has the highest workload during the
resolution process ranging from 265 ms (for 1 pseudonym)
to 1, 598 ms (for 200 pseudonyms).
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented the implementation of a dis-
tributed VPKI architecture in order to provide security and
privacy protection in VC. We proposed the use of tickets to
guarantee unlinkability between consecutive vehicle requests
for pseudonyms, when a new ticket is used for each request.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that pro-
vides AAA capabilities for a VPKI according to the current
standards and the privacy requirements. Part of our future
work includes the integration of relevant privacy-preserving
methods and anonymous authentication techniques in our
protocols. We believe that our scheme is efficient, appli-
cable and thus, it can pave the road towards secure and
privacy-preserving VC.
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